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The Colombian-Lebanese community has existed in Bogota since the turn of the 20th 
century, a time when many Lebanese and Middle Easterners in general were 
migrating to the Americas. This group of migrants was not homogenous, and their 
background, settlement and development in the host countries took them through 
different paths. Whilst some assimilated into the local societies, losing their 
connection to their ancestral homeland, others maintained their Lebanese identity, 
forming a dual home-host sense of belonging. The active Colombian-Lebanese 
community in Bogota is made up of first to fourth generation individuals, of upper 
and middle-class families. As seen below, the socio-economic composition of the 
community is due to the societal structures in Colombia and to the community’s own 
exclusionary practices, and their organisations, events and activities are conducted 
within the channels provided by their elite position. They have created different types 
of organisations in order to promote their ethnic identity, strengthen their sense of 
belonging within the community, and reinforce their social status in the local society, 
a pattern that is similarly replicated by other Lebanese diasporic communities in Latin 
America.  
 
This chapter looks into the visible and active Colombian-Lebanese community, their 
organisations and events, and draws on ethnographic research carried out in Bogota 
from 2008 to 2013, including interviews conducted with members of the communityi 
and participant observation of their events. It focuses specifically on the participation 
of the Colombian-Lebanese community in two public demonstrations – events where 
these upper and middle-class Colombian-Lebanese were able to play with their ethnic 
and social class identities, within specific elite spaces. I build on Alfaro-Velcamp’s 
(2013) argument that these elite individuals have used their Lebaneseness as a mark 
of foreignness to strengthen their position in society. I demonstrate that the 
Colombian-Lebanese have multiple expressions of citizenship, which they see as 
complementary to each other. They actively portray their foreignness as a way of 
maintaining their privileged foreign status in society - the more they connect their 
ethnicity with aspects of upper-middle class status, the stronger claim the community 
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has to keep their privileged status; and, in addition, their elite status allows them to 
make collective demands that benefit the community as a whole. Moreover, by 
keeping their events and organisations within elite spaces, the Colombian-Lebanese 
are also restricting the participation of non-elite individuals and effectively creating 
an obstacle to their potential expressions of citizenship. These arguments can be 
extrapolated to other Latin American countries where elite Lebanese/Arab diasporas 
exist. 
 
Foreign citizens and desired immigrants 
The Lebanese have migrated to the Americas since the late 1800s, with the largest 
waves being registered until the 1930s and during the Lebanese Civil War (1970s-
80s), and continue to do so in smaller numbers. Large numbers settled in Latin 
America, with countries like Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and Colombia receiving the 
largest share. The reasons for their migration are varied and include economic 
hardship, avoidance of military conscription, the search for new opportunities, and the 
influence of friend and family networks (see Salibi 1965; Hitti 1967; Klich 1992; 
Issawi 1992; Humphrey 1998; Traboulsi 2007). It is difficult to know the exact 
number of Lebanese that travelled to Latin America or to Colombia as there are no 
reliable migration records. Estimates of the current population of Lebanese 
descendants in Colombia vary from around 50,000 in 1992 (Fawcett 1992) to over 
one million in 2011 (Carrillo and Cuevas 2011). Regardless of the exact number, they 
were numerous enough to allow them to sustain local communities, but not to create a 
minority group in the country. 
 
The authors above, and my own participants, relay similar stories about the settlement 
and development of these Lebanese migrants, where many were economically 
successful and upwardly mobile. Friend and family networks made it easier for them 
to earn money and set up businesses. The profits made allowed them to send their 
children to university, and a large number of wealthier second-generation Lebanese 
descendants became lawyers, doctors and engineers. Many of them married into 
wealthy local families, further influencing their upward social mobility, in some cases 
reaching the top of the economic and/or political elite. Indeed, examples of their rise 
and success socially, financially and politically have been documented by several 
authors in different geographical contexts in Latin America, including Colombia 
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(Fawcett and Posada-Carbo 1992; Vargas and Suaza 2007), Brazil (Karam 2007), 
Mexico (Alfaro-Velcamp 2007), Chile (Bray 1962), and Ecuador (Bejarano 1997). An 
example of this can be seen with the political influence of individuals of Lebanese 
descent in Colombia, including Gabriel Turbay – a former senator and presidential 
candidate in 1946; Julio Cesar Turbay – former minister, ambassador and 25th 
president of Colombia (1978-1982) (Vargas and Suaza 2007); as well as many other 
city mayors, senators, congressmen and government ministers (Di Ricco 2014). 
Indeed, Fawcett and Posada-Carbo (1992) estimated that in 1992 at least 11% of 
Colombian senators had Lebanese ancestry. Individuals of Lebanese, and generally of 
Arab descent, also reached the highest positions of power in other Latin American 
countries, including: Carlos Menem in Argentina (1989-1999); Abdala Bucaram and 
Jamil Mahuad in Ecuador (1996-1997; and 1998-2000); Carlos Flores of Honduras 
(1998-2002); Antonio Saca of El Salvador (2004-2009); and Michel Temer of Brazil 
(2016-incumbent). It is important to note, however, that these individuals did not 
reach these positions by playing on their ethnic heritage, but rather through political, 
ideological and policy means. 
   
As time passed and the diasporic community developed, some families retained close 
connections to the ethnic community throughout the years, some families kept faint 
links, and others lost them completely. Alfaro-Velcamp (2013) explains this by 
theorising that different groups of migrants were considered as more or less desirable 
by the receiving Latin American countries. As such, white European and North 
American migrants were considered more desirable than black or East Asian 
migrants. She argues that the former ‘desirable’ migrants found it easier to maintain 
their ethnic identity and foreign status, and even share elite spaces with the local 
middle and upper classes. However, the latter ‘undesired’ migrants were more likely 
to be discriminated against, found it hard to succeed and were forced to assimilate 
fully into the local society in order to diminish their undesirability, losing their ties 
with their ethnic and cultural identities. According to Alfaro-Velcamp, the Lebanese 
migrants found themselves in an ambiguous position, as their precedence and 
phenotype did not clearly place them in either category – instead belonging to an 
ambivalent category which she terms “foreign citizens”, framed by their socio-
economic success, and that of their ancestors. She argues that the first generation of 
Lebanese migrants had to show signs of acculturation into the local society in order to 
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succeed, and the results of this acculturation affected the later generations. The 
descendants of those that were financially successful were able to create a hybrid 
identity between their Lebanese cultural ethnicity and the local identity, felt more 
comfortable publicly performing their hybridity, and similarly to the ‘desired’ 
migrants, began sharing spaces with the local elite. However, the descendants of those 
that were not financially successful had to assimilate into the local society, just as the 
descendants of the ‘undesired’ migrants had to do, eventually losing their ties and 
belonging to their Lebanese identity. These ideas of selected acculturation, 
assimilation and economic success link to the notion that in Latin America 
‘whiteness’ is connected with wealth, where the elite centres of power are considered 
as more ‘white’ (Wade 2000), where whiteness is seen as coming from a “good 
family” (Chua 2003:69), and where “the poor are often identified as non-white” 
(Alcantara 2005:1667). Just as the European and North American migrants benefited 
from the racialisation of socio-economic status due to their phenotype, the 
descendants of successful Lebanese migrants, whose phenotype was not necessarily 
white nor non-white, benefited from the wealth their ancestors created, as it made 
them ‘whiter’ and more ‘desirable’ than their less wealthy counterparts.  
 
As the Lebanese migrants and especially their descendants became part of the local 
elite, their social circles, the locations of their homes, the schools and universities they 
attended, and their spaces of socialisation, became the same as those of other 
members of the elite. They also set up a number of social, economic, political, 
charitable, and religious organisations that worked alongside, and sometimes rivalled, 
the already established elite organisations. These Lebanese organisations have helped 
them reinforce their common identity as well as maintain their elite status, validating 
their position as “foreign citizens”. As it is explained below, the participation in the 
Colombian-Lebanese community, its events and activities, including those of a 
political nature, are tightly connected to their particular socio-economic status. This is 
the case not only for Colombia, but elsewhere in Latin America too as similar 
attitudes can be seen in Mexico – where Alfaro-Velcamp’s study was based, as well 
as in Brazil (Karam 2007), Chile (Agar-Corbinos 2009), Ecuador (Bejarano 1997) and 
Peru (Bartet 2009), among others. Indeed, by portraying their ethnic identity within 
elite spaces, these wealthy Colombian-Lebanese are highlighting their ‘desirable 
foreignness’ to the local society, validating their citizenship from an elite position, 
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whilst distancing themselves from ‘less desirable’ status and segregating from non-
elite individuals. 
 
In Bogota, there are a number of Colombian-Lebanese organisations, including a 
social club, a political and cultural organisation, a charitable association, a chamber of 
commerce, and a Christian Maronite Parish. Of importance for this chapter are the 
former two: the social club, called Club Colombo-Libanés, and the political and 
cultural organisation, called The World Lebanese Cultural Union – Colombia Chapter 
(or ULCM for its acronym in Spanish). They help set the context to explain the 
political participation of the Colombian-Lebanese in public protests, including the 
initiatives to meet their collective demands, their exclusionary practices, as well as the 
importance of the interaction of their socio-economic status and their ethnic identity, 
for their positioning within Colombian society. 
 
The Club Colombo-Libanés 
Mostly referred to by my participants simply as ‘the Club’, the Club Colombo-
Libanés is a relatively small, private social club located in a prestigious upper-class 
neighbourhood in the north of the Bogota. The Club has been the ethnic and social 
centre of the Colombian-Lebanese since its foundation in the 1950s, and the other 
Colombian-Lebanese organisations use its facilitiesii for their events. It is a 
constructed Colombian-Lebanese ethnic and social space, where the Colombian-
Lebanese often perform their ethnic and social identities. In theory, the Club is a 
members-only establishment, however, many its facilities are available to non-
members as well, as they can be invited as guests and the spaces can be privately 
rented for events. In this sense, the Club has a dual capacity, as a social and ethnic 
space for the Colombian-Lebanese, and as a business space for private hire. Even 
though its name has an ethnic connotation, its exclusivity makes it practically 
inaccessible to any working-class Lebanese migrants or descendant, and it is more 
likely to see middle and upper-class non-Lebanese Colombians visit the Club, as 
guests of Colombian-Lebanese members or as private renters.   
 
There may be different reasons for the foundation of the Club. Firstly, Wade (2000:68) 
states that in Colombia “class identity was expressed powerfully through the creation 
of elite social clubs”, so the Colombian-Lebanese could have been trying to live up to 
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their “foreign citizen” status by founding a social club. However, Fawcett and Posada-
Carbo (1998:27) argue that the Lebanese migrants founded their own social clubs 
after being denied membership at more established elite social clubs. If they were 
denied entrance, it means some sectors of society may not have accepted them at the 
time as part of the elite. At the same time, my participants stated the Club was created 
to provide a gathering space for the Lebanese migrants and their families, but that its 
small size is because it has to compete with other elite social clubs in terms of 
membership. In fact, many Colombian-Lebanese are members of other social clubs in 
Bogota, country social clubs and city social clubs. Therefore, the reasons for its 
foundation are likely to combine these sentiments. It is possible the club was founded 
in a period when the Colombian-Lebanese were still hanging on the balance between 
being considered ‘desirable’ or ‘undesirable’, so were not accepted into already 
stablished elite social clubs. The community then decided to create a place of 
gathering to foster a sense of belonging and a safe space for ethnic identification, 
whilst also actively portraying their rising socio-economic status. Then, as time went 
by and the Colombian-Lebanese climbed the social ladder, they became more 
‘desirable’ and as such were able to join those other elite social clubs that their 
parents or grandparents were not able to join. 
 
The Club relocated to its current premises in 1967, from the socio-economically 
mixed centre of the city into the wealthier north, a move that further suggest their 
transition into ‘desirability’. They moved into a large house in the prestigious Chicó 
neighbourhood, surrounded by other large traditional houses and nearby traditional 
and international schools (the Lycée Français less than 200 meters away). From the 
outside, there are few clues as to the nature of the place: it is surrounded by a white 
wall and fence, with tall trees peering over from the inside garden, and patrolled by 
security guards (as most building in the area). The Club looks like a traditional Chicó 
grand house from the 1960s. The only clues to it are a small sign on the entrance that 
has the club’s name and a cedar tree; and the Colombian and Lebanese flags, which 
are hoisted high within the walls. Only a careful observer would notice these clues 
and for the most part, it blends within the neighbourhood. Some of these houses have 
disappeared from the area, and stylish modern building stand in their place. Therefore, 
from the outside, the Club stands more as a reminder of the traditional past of the 




All of these factors suggest that the Club can be described as an “allowed space” 
(Montero Diaz 2014:53) for the Colombian-Lebanese, where they feel “safe and 
comfortable, where they can avoid being discriminated against and can distance 
themselves from people ‘not like them’, who they consider different ethnically, 
socially, culturally or by class.” Indeed, this “allowed space” is used for both as a 
sense of security for the group as well as a tool for segregation from others (Montero 
Diaz 2014). They can meet, behind closed doors and inside high walls, where they are 
not disturbed or questioned if they perform their ethnicity, and where they can feel 
safe. At the same time, the club is also an exclusionary space, not easily accessible to 
those without the socio-economic means or connections, who would be unlikely to 
access it and could be barred from entering by the security guards. It is both an 
‘allowed space’ where the elite Colombian-Lebanese can perform their ethnicity 
without needing to explain it, whilst it perpetuates the segregation between the classes, 
as it ensures that participation remains within the elite.   
 
As mentioned above, other Colombian-Lebanese organisations also use the Club for 
their activities, either as a base or as the main centre for their events. One such 
organisation is the ULCMiii, a worldwide organisation with a set of specific rules 
surrounding the promotion of Lebanese culture and the defence of Lebanese political 
sovereignty. Their events are of interest for this chapter and are here discussed – all of 
which have a strong connection to the Club.  
 
The July War of 2006 
During the summer of 2006, the Lebanese group Hezbollah – a long-time foe of Israel 
and labelled as a terrorist organisation by numerous countries – attacked some Israeli 
border towns and kidnapped two Israeli soldiers. Israel retaliated by attacking 
Hezbollah positions in Lebanon and bombing several towns and cities, including the 
Lebanese capital, Beirut. The war lasted just over a month and resulted in the deaths 
of more than 1,100 Lebanese people, mostly civilians (Ruys 2007: 266; and Hamieh 
and Mac Ginty 2009). At that time, a large number of Colombian-Lebanese were in 
Lebanon, visiting friends and family, claiming they were “reconnecting with their 
roots” or simply visiting the country as tourists. They were caught in the middle of 
this conflict and, with a shutdown airport, were unable to leave. As a result, the 
8 
 
Colombian-Lebanese community in Bogota mobilised, calling the international 
community for an immediate cease-fire and the Colombian government for a rescue 
operation. The calls for a cease-fire involved the production of anti-war materials, 
including stickers, pins, and posters with the slogan “Cese al fuego en el Medio 
Oriente” [Cease Fire in the Middle East], and organising a public demonstration. 
These actions gathered a large number of Colombian-Lebanese individuals and led to 
the revival of the ULCM. 
 
At the time of the events, Colombian national newspaper El Tiempo ran a number of 
stories highlighting the plight of the Colombian-Lebanese stranded in Lebanon and 
even quoted prominent Colombian-Lebanese individuals in their newspaper. One of 
them was a participant of mine, a first generation Colombian-Lebanese male in his 
80s who was in Beirut at the time: 
[the Israelis] are savagely destroying the country. I ask to God that they have a 
consciousness and that they stop this. It’s not fair. I hope the killing stops. 
(Quote of the Day, El Tiempo 2006) 
 
The newspaper published at least five different articles focusing on the impact the 
conflict was having on the Colombian-Lebanese community in Lebanon and 
Colombia, with quotes and pictures, suggesting the community was seen as 
significant enough to have time and space dedicated to them in an important national 
publication. This was not surprising, as not only several prominent journalists are 
Colombian-Lebanese, but also as the community is composed of upper and middle-
class individuals, it has connections with important media outlets. 
 
As mentioned above, the community also organised a demonstration calling for a 
cease-fire. One of my participants explained:  
…it was an apolitical march… the philosophy was to ask for support to cease 
the bombardment because it was an almost unilateral attack – because a group 
such as Hezbollah, regardless of how well-armed they are, cannot counter a 
regular army. [The march] was done firstly, in order not to stain with politics 
that opposition to the bombing, so the march would not lose strength; secondly, 
to not exclude the Lebanese Muslims; thirdly, to get as much support as 
possible. That was the criteria… [it went] well, because many people went and 
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it had certain echo, as it was reported in the national media - briefly but it was 
reported… we gathered outside [the area of the protest] and then walked back 
to the Club... – (second generation Colombian-Lebanese, male, 40s).  
 
His account is somewhat contradictory, as the demonstration and his own words do 
seem to have a political motive, i.e. just protesting against the conflict is a political 
statement, and my participant’s argument that the conflict was “almost a unilateral 
attack” is already taking sides. Rather than apolitical, the demonstration was planned 
to be as inclusive as possible, to include those supporting Arab causes in the Middle 
East, as well as peace activists in general, and Lebanese nationalists in particular.  
 
Interestingly, the demonstration did not take place near any embassy or local 
governmental building, but in front of the UN mission to Colombia. The mission has 
its offices in the wealthy Northern neighbourhoods in Bogota, and this particular one 
was only 2.1km away from the Club. In fact, the demonstration started at the social 
club and participants walked the 2km to the UN offices. By comparison, the Israeli 
Embassy is over 8km away from the Club, the main Colombian governmental 
buildings are over 9km away, and neither is situated in wealthy areas. The 
Colombian-Lebanese decided to keep their protest within the comfort of the wealthy 
neighbourhoods of Bogota, and near the social club. In this sense, they made a 
deliberate choice regarding the space to stage their demonstration and display their 
discontent with the events in Lebanon. The location of the demonstration was also an 
‘allowed space’, this time not physical behind walls, but a wider wealthier area that 
not only reflected their socio-economic status and granted opportunities for social 
interaction, but also reinforced that elite status by making a statement about their 
social standing. According to a Colombian newspaper article, around 600 people 
participated in the demonstration (El País 2006), including several of my participants. 
One of them recounted their experience in this way:  
I went to the demonstration and I kept the [cease-fire] pins and everything. I 
got my friends involved as well, told them to buy the pins and support me. I 
explained that it was a really serious situation for my community… I was 
there in front [of the UN offices] and there were people who were not 
Lebanese, people that one would say to them come and support us. And I love 
the solidarity in those kinds of things. It was, like, to make the Lebanese 
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community be felt, even though we weren’t there [in Lebanon] it affects us 
that the country one can identify with is in such a conflict... it is something 
incredible… I said wow there’s a lot of solidarity for those kinds of things, 
and I liked that it wasn’t only us but that people here also felt affected, as it 
was terrible… my uncle asked me to go and I said yes, and then we could go 
to the club for lunch. The club is the meeting point – (fourth-generation 
Colombian-Lebanese, female, late teens). 
 
My participant’s words stress the significance of the event in terms of increasing 
solidarity both within and for the community, and highlight the importance of the 
Club, socially and practically. Even though a large number of individuals attended the 
event, only those Club members and guests of members were able to meet up at the 
Club afterwards to “have lunch”. The wider public was not invited to participate in 
this social activity, and those that did were “friends” that had middle and upper-class 
backgrounds (whether they were Lebanese or not). Access to their “allowed space” 
was conditional on their socio-economic status, not on their expression of solidarity or 
their ethnicity. 
  
My participant’s words underline how the social aspect influences other objectives the 
events may have. Something similar happened with the 20th of July march in 2008, 
which I discuss below, when a number of Colombian-Lebanese set off from the Club 
to join the march, and many of them returned there again after it finished in order to 
have lunch. Performing their ethnic identity was made even more attractive by the 
social activities connected to it, even as an excuse to meet up socially and, at least in 
my participant’s case, the lunch seems to have been an expectation connected to the 
participation. 
 
These activities also heightened the visibility of the Colombian-Lebanese community 
as it was making itself felt. Indeed, the conflict led many Colombian-Lebanese to 
make their ethnicity more visible, either by attending the demonstrations, carrying 
Lebanese flags, or portraying the anti-war merchandise. The July War awoke a sense 
of solidarity among some Colombian-Lebanese, and this led them to take action. 
Another one of my participants, a second-generation Colombian-Lebanese in her mid-
50s, saw the event as a “beautiful” memory to be remembered, with large 
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congregation of Colombian-Lebanese carrying Lebanese flags and displaying their 
ethnic identity. My participant connects her memories of the protest not with the 
suffering of those caught up in the conflict, or with the urgency of rescuing those in 
Lebanon unable to leave, but with the imagery it created in Bogota and the sense of 
belonging it generated amongst the participants.  The demonstration was a kind of 
“in-between” space (Bhabha 1994) for the Colombian-Lebanese, created by the 
encounter of their identities (Colombian socio-economic status identity and their 
Colombian-Lebanese ethnic identity) where factors such as political goals, 
convenience of location and a social gathering, combined together to generate a 
common feeling of belonging. 
 
The heightened feelings of belonging generated by the demonstration and the conflict 
in general had longer lasting repercussions for the community, as they led to the 
revival of the cultural and political organisation, ULCM. My participants retell this 
process as a tale of reencountering old friends and old feelings of belonging: 
 
Unfortunately the [July] war comes… and has an effect on those people who 
felt Lebanese before and had left that feeling to the side… that moment 
renewed/stirred that love and that pain, that complete rejection [to the war]. A 
lot of feelings that above everything made people come together to see what 
could be done… from that we started to remember things we had forgotten, we 
started to sign, started to dance, we began the meetings amongst the 
Lebanese… and as someone said – a phrase that I love: the (blood) cells find 
each other again... – (second generation Colombian-Lebanese, female, early 
50s) 
 
…we understood that we loved each other very much, that we had met again 
and that we wanted to stay together. So we thought of the possibility of 
creating something… and someone mentioned to me, why don’t we think 
again about the ULCM? – (third generation Colombian-Lebanese, female, 
early 50s) 
 
My perception is that because of the July war in 2006 people started getting 
back together. People didn’t use to go to the Club much… We [her family] 
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weren’t members… after the war people started to unite again, to look for one 
another and went to the Club to an event thanking those that helped during the 
war, including the Colombian government… I think that because of the war a 
lot of cool things have been developing – (fourth generation Colombian-
Lebanese, female, mid-20s) 
 
Indeed, what my participants explain is that the events of the July War not only led to 
the revival of the ULCM, but they also allowed them a space where they could 
display both their socio-economic and their ethnic identity. Many of these individuals 
had been members of the ULCM in their youth, and remembered its social gatherings 
and events, with other Colombian-Lebanese families of similar socio-economic 
standing – and they also wanted their own children to experience this. The revival 
therefore, was not just political or cultural, but also significantly an agency for the 
maintenance of their community through social events. Most of my participants 
focused heavily on the importance of social events, not just for the community but in 
general. In a sense, the political agenda seems to take a back seat to the opportunities 
to socialise and strengthen their ethnic identity through their elite channels. 
 
In political terms, the demonstration did not achieve much – which is not surprising 
seeing that it only took place once and was geographically removed from most actors 
who were directly involved. However, the community was successful in pressuring 
the Colombian government through their personal and network contacts into sending 
a military plane to rescue the Colombian-Lebanese who were accidentally stranded in 
Lebanon. One of my participants who was evacuated from Lebanon at the time, the 
same individual that was quoted by the newspaper, commented that a group of 
Colombian-Lebanese in Colombia worked as a network to organise their rescue, using 
their influence and contacts: 
…the community here, my family, and people I know [got together]. And I 
specially thank Minister Juan Manuel Santos for his concern to pick up the 
Colombians that were there [in Lebanon]… the Colombian government and its 
Embassy in Lebanon helped getting out of Lebanon a group of over 100 
Colombian people and the Colombian Air Force sent a big military plane and 
got us out from the north of Lebanon and took us to Zaragoza. It was a very 
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sad and painful odyssey for me… (first generation Colombia-Lebanese, male, 
80s). 
 
After the successful rescue operation, the community leaders organised a reception at 
the Club to welcome back the Colombian-Lebanese who had been stranded in 
Lebanon and to thank those officially involved with the rescue, including the military 
commanders who led the mission and the then Defence Minister Santos, who later 
became President. It is unsurprising that the way to celebrate the achievement of their 
collective demand was through a social event in the Club, with members of the 
political elite.  
 
In this sense, the Colombian-Lebanese used their connections and political influence 
to ensure their collective demands were met – even if that meant leaving a country 
they professed to feel a belonging to. It was their social and political connections that 
allowed them to achieve their aims connected to their ethnic identity. The success of 
their collective pressure to the Colombian authorities demonstrates they are seen, and 
see themselves, as worthy citizens of the nation - and of course as part of a 
community that is powerful enough to get their way when organised. Fittingly, the 
success of the mission was celebrated at the Club, where the Colombian-Lebanese 
were able to thank those involved, whilst simultaneously portraying their socio-
economic status. The July War was, therefore, a catalyst for the community as it 
increased the active participation of Colombian-Lebanese within the community, both 
by providing spaces to re-engage their dormant feelings of belonging to their ethnic 
identity, and by the revival of a cultural and political association. It re-connected 
members of the community and allowed for future events and activities to take place – 
one of which is explored below. 
 
Peace March against the FARC 
A significant political event in Colombia took place two years later, on the 20th July 
2008, with a march against the now mostly disbanded Colombian left-wing terrorist 
organisation, the FARC. There were protests in different cities in Colombia and 
around the world, which focused especially on the kidnappings of both civilians and 
members of the armed forces by the FARC. The most common slogan was “No Más 
Farc” [No More Farc]. The event was also a display of Colombian patriotism by the 
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general Colombian public and supported by the government, both to raise patriotism 
and increase its political support – coinciding with Colombia’s National Independence 
Day. The day, usually celebrated by the government with military parades and taken 
as a holiday by most Colombians, was this time celebrated with ‘peace’ marches and 
concerts across Colombia: “millions of people” attended in over 1,000 towns and 
cities (El Universal 2008). The event had a detailed organisation of logistics, with 
demarcated routes, timetables of the events at the different locations, concerts by 
famous Colombian artists, video screening of other events around the country, and an 
active participation from the government and the military, as well as politicians from 
different political parties. The government was able to capitalise on the previous 
efforts and get millions of Colombians to wave flags in a patriotic atmosphere.   
 
The ULCM participated in this demonstration and encouraged Colombian-Lebanese 
individuals to join them under the ULCM banners, with flyers and announcements 
posted at the Club and emails sent to all members. A group of around 30-40 
Colombian-Lebanese met at the Club for this purpose. There were a number of 
arranged routes and centres of congregation in Bogota for this protest, and the 
Colombian-Lebanese chose to march to one just under 2km away from the Club. 
Once again, convenience and pragmatism prevailed, as they stayed in the wealthy 
north of Bogota marching to the congregation centre that was closest to the Club. It is 
likely that many would have taken this route anyway, even if they had not been part 
of the group leaving from the Club, as some live near that area; however, others also 
travelled from further away in order to join the group. Indeed, this was also the same 
route taken by many other Colombians of similar socio-economic characteristics. 
Once again, an ‘allowed space’ was chosen for participation, in this case a specific 
route that allowed them to mingle with individuals of similar socio-economic status 
and segregated them from others. 
 
My participants left the club wearing white t-shirts, as the event demanded, as well as 
carrying a large ULCM banner, and Colombian and Lebanese flags. As the group 
joined the march from a side street, they were received with applause from other 
participants, and as the march progressed, my participants often greeted friends or 
colleagues, and welcomed other Colombian-Lebanese who joined the group. Under 
the ULCM banner the Colombian-Lebanese were proactively presenting themselves 
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to the general public as Colombian-Lebanese, i.e. as Colombians of Lebanese descent 
who had joined in a portrayal of Colombian solidarity with a combination of 
Colombian and Lebanese national symbols. They were sharing a space where 
Colombianness was being performed and appropriating it to perform their dual 
Colombian-Lebanese identity. This was a fluid deterritorialised space, not bound to a 
particular location but rather to the performance of their ethnicity (De Certau 1984; 
Faist 1998). The Colombian-Lebanese ethnic space moved along the streets of the 
wealthy North of Bogota, permeating the Colombian space, making their ethnic 
community more visible and reproducing it within a context, as a specific ‘niche’ 
within the upper and middle-classes of Bogota. 
 
Some of the slogans used during the demonstration by the public evoked the coming 
together of all Colombians to reject of the FARC and call for the freedom of the 
kidnap victims. Others, such as “Colombia soy yo” [I am Colombia], aimed at 
increasing feelings of patriotism towards Colombia at an individual level whilst 
expressing that the FARC were in this case ‘the other’ and not representing Colombia. 
Some Colombian-Lebanese wore t-shirts with the slogan “Colombia soy yo”, whilst at 
the same time carrying Lebanese flags and ULCM banners. Their actions suggested 
the Colombian-Lebanese were at ease with the performance of their dual ethnic 
identities which allowed them to simultaneously claim to be the embodiment of 
Colombia and carry Lebanese symbols. This demonstrates the multiplicity and 
fluidity of their identities (Hall 1996) which are able to switch and mould into the 
particular contexts. Indeed, their ease with the dual portrayal of Colombian and 
Lebanese symbols suggests that they do not see their ethnic identities as contradictory 
and that they ‘are’ also Colombia. This is connected to Alfaro-Velcamp’s (2013) idea 
of “foreign citizens”, where they identify as being born in the local country whilst 
portraying their Lebanese heritage. The fact the Colombian-Lebanese are able to 
actively demonstrate their dual identity within elite “allowed spaces” further confirms 
and reinforces their own elite position, both to themselves and to the public around 
them. 
 
It is worth noting, however, that as soon as the march ended and people began 
dispersing, the leaders of the ULCM group were keen to have the flags and banners 
folded before walking the 2km back to the Club. It is unclear why this decision was 
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taken, maybe to speed up the walk and get faster to the Club to have lunch, but 
regardless of the reason, during the way back my participants were simply another 
group of Colombians wearing white t-shirts, dispersing after having protested against 
the FARC. They were indistinct from those around them. By doing so the Colombian-
Lebanese demonstrated that they are able to decide when to perform their 
Lebaneseness and, just as easily, when to stop performing it. In this sense, the 
Colombian-Lebanese can easily switch from being Colombian to being Colombian-
Lebanese, and vice versa. After the demonstration, a large number of participants 
went once again to socialise and eat at the Club, just as after the July War protest.  
 
It must be noted that not all Colombian-Lebanese that marched and are active in the 
community did so with the ULCM group and under its banner. Some marched only 
carrying Colombian symbols, portraying only their Colombian identity. A number of 
reasons may have contributed to this: the group was led by the ULCM and not all 
Colombian-Lebanese are involved in the organisation or share its beliefs; a few may 
have chosen to march through a different route if it was more convenient to them; and 
others may have chosen to march with their non-Lebanese Colombian friends. 
Significantly, the fact the Colombian-Lebanese have this choice of when to portray 
certain aspects of their ethnicity suggests a high level of flexibility within their 
identity. Moreover, they are also able to choose how to perform their identities 
(Colombian or Colombian-Lebanese), and are able to switch between them with ease 
– even at political events promoting Colombian identification. This level of flexibility 
is closely connected to their upper and middle-class status in society, and several 
authors have suggested that individuals must be in a privileged position in society, be 
upwardly mobile, and not suffering from discrimination in order to be able to choose 
how and when to perform their ethnic identities (Gans 1979; Portes and Rumbaut 
2001; Sullivan 2012). For example, Gans (1979, 8) introduced the idea of “symbolic 
ethnicity” which helps explain how newer generations “have some choice about when 
and how to play ethnic roles”. He argues that symbolic ethnicity is about the 
individual’s sense of belonging. The Colombian-Lebanese are part of the Colombian 
elite and their ethnicity is enhanced by the different activities and events they 
participate in. More importantly, they have a choice of when to portray it and are not 
obliged to assimilate, making their “symbolic ethnicity” also about practicing and 





Throughout this chapter I have analysed the Colombian-Lebanese community in 
Bogota, and specifically their participation in public demonstrations. The similarities 
between the marches must be highlighted: they were for common causes, in the same 
wealthy areas of the city, and projecting a Colombian-Lebanese identity. They 
combined politics, convenience and the promise of a social gathering with similarly 
upper and middle-class individuals to make them more appealing. They have, 
simultaneously created “in-between” spaces (Bhabha 1994) where a sense of 
belonging to an ethnic identification can be performed and recreated. These 
performances suggest that the Colombian-Lebanese are able to choose when to 
display their Colombian-Lebanese identity and when not to. They can decide whether 
to join in a particular activity, to wear clothing or carry items that can identify them as 
Colombian-Lebanese, and even the location of these performances. In addition, they 
can also manage the visibility of their performances and are able to portray their dual 
identity with Colombia and Lebanon seemingly without discomfort. What allows 
them this flexibility is their elite socio-economic status: it vindicates their Colombian 
citizenship as they simultaneously claim identity to another nation, whilst letting them 
confidently portray their dual ethnic identity and pursue their collective demands. As 
“foreign citizens” the Colombian-Lebanese play with both of these identities, socio-
economic and ethnic, in order to maximise the perceived needs of their collective.  
 
At the same time, by setting their organisations and marches within elite spaces the 
Colombian-Lebanese are reinforcing their belonging to the upper and middle-classes, 
whilst creating a barrier for the vindication of citizenship of those that do not fit with 
the ideals of that perceived status. In this way, Colombian-Lebanese individuals who 
are not middle or upper-class will find it more difficult to access the spaces the 
community uses to portray their ethnic identity and duality of belonging. Therefore, 
they simultaneously create avenues of vindication of citizenship for upper and 
middle-class Colombian-Lebanese, whilst creating barriers for those non-elite 
individuals.  
 
Finally, their practices and expressions of citizenship, through the participation in 
public demonstrations, helps them stablish their position within the socio-economic 
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elite and afforded them a special ‘niche’, based around their ethnicity and “foreign 
citizen” status. These marches, which combine their ethnic and political agendas, 
reproduce the community in “allowed spaces” within the wider elite social sphere of 
the city. They are public statements and portrayals that display the strength of the 
ethnic community, and its socio-economic status, within the already-established elite. 
Their participation in these two protests further strengthened their voice as a 
community, both to make demands and to reinforce their social standing, but also 
made it more difficult for less wealthy individuals to participate. The Colombian-
Lebanese have managed to use both their ethnic and socio-economic statuses to 
complement and balance one another, making the most out of them for the benefit of 
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i I conducted over 50 interviews with members of the Colombian-Lebanese community, the youngest 
being in their late teens, and the eldest in their 80s. My data includes individuals from every age group, 
however, the most common ages were 40s to 60s – who in general were more active in the community. 
This was due to a variety of reasons, from wanting their children to have a belonging to the community 
to having the time to participate actively due to retirement, among others. All of the names of my 
participants have been omitted and are presented as anonymous following the ethics approval forms 
signed by them. Their gender and generation are given, but only their approximate age, as an exact age 
would make them more recognisable. 
ii The Club’s facilities include a large restaurant, a bar, several meeting rooms, squash courts, a 
multipurpose salon, a children’s playground and an activity room.  
iii The ULCM has ‘chapters’ in many countries, including Colombia, where it operates mainly from 
within the Club. It has been greatly affected by Lebanese politics – including its hiatus starting with the 
Lebanese Civil War until the early 2000s, and its revival during the 2006 July War in Lebanon. 
